Raffaele Giordano and Alessandro Pagano

The same Greek origin of the word ‘crisis’ entails the concept of judgment, implying the crucial capacity to make sense and disentangle the clues of a rapidly evolving situation. Evidences demonstrate the danger of lack or delayed decision making during crisis. Decision making and its enactment demands the coordinated involvement of experts and organizations from several fields.

As social systems become increasingly more interdependent with physical and technical systems acting at interconnected spatial and temporal scales, the range of possible interactions among individuals, groups, and organizations, and the context in which these all function increases. Also the number of factors that influence the potential actions and outcomes in constructive or destructive ways also increases. This interconnectedness among the different elements of the system could lead to what we call/are called interdependent crisis. That is, the disruption of one element in the system (e.g. an infrastructure) causes appreciable impact on other elements, which in turn cause further effects on other parts of the system. The extent to which these effects propagate, and how serious these effects become, depends on how tightly coupled the components of the system are, how strong is the original cause, and whether or not adequate counter-measures are in place.

The core activity of taking decisions and implementing actions in this complex and highly dynamic environment often exceeds the ability of a single centralized entity to cope. No single entity can have complete control of these multi-scale, distributed, highly interactive networks, or the ability to evaluate, monitor and manage these emergencies in real time. It’s becoming crucial to overcome the classical emergency management approaches in which institutional organizational structure tends to follow stable boundaries, established authority figures, and protocol driven actions.

Nowadays the response to crises becomes an emerging, large-scale system consisting of individuals, groups, organizations and jurisdictions that need to coordinate their actions for delivering effective operations. In crises, a “temporary multi-organisation” as defined by Cherns and Bryant (1984) needs to be deployed, implying several difficulties of coordination and shared management of the situation(s). Cooperative response actions need to be carried out in a network form (Abbasi, 2014), and can benefit or be impaired by the connectivity patterns of the different emergency responders (Vespignani, 2011).


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How can we make coordination among the different responders more effective, when a fast and efficient response is required? Enhancing the coordination effectiveness in case of emergency among the different responders is the main scope of several studies aimed at overcoming the main organizational factors hindering cooperation. Up to now, most research has been carried out on what happens within a single organisation under stress, while knowledge is still limited on what happens when multiple organisations need to coordinate in unison to make the best of their capacity in a highly stressful environment. Different barriers can hamper the coordination and communication among different responders, i.e. lack of cross-sectors structures, lack of common goals, lack of common concepts, lack of distribution of information, lack of trust, competitive practices and lack of situational awareness.

Organizational culture is emerging as a crucial aspect to be considered in assessing the performance of an organization. In emergency, organizational culture affects the way different responders interpret the situation, organize tasks and interact with the others.
Existing formal protocols of interaction ignore how cultural diversities, with specific reference to organizational culture, influence the way different actors perceive the topology of their own interactional network, and, consequently, their strategies to cooperate with other entities. Empirical evidences demonstrate how some actors assume a strongly hierarchical structure of the interactions (Sorensen & Stanton, 2013). Other actors consider the multi-central structure as the most effective one to allow the rapid exchange of information and cooperation within each level of the organizational structure and between different levels (Smart & Sycara, 2013). Neglecting these differences could lead to the development of ineffective procedures for emergency management, because the actors will not recognize the network through which they collect the information and cooperate as trustable.

The dynamic and complex nature of crisis situations does not allow for a static framework of the crisis responses. Interaction networks change dramatically during an emergency. Some actors could assume the role of informal leaders, whereas the official responders could be characterized by a low level of trust. The existing institutional protocols for information management in case of emergency seem incapable of adapting themselves to this changing interactional situation.

Finally, the process of interpreting the emergency information (i.e. sensemaking) has to be considered as a social process aiming at selectively focus on certain stimuli and responses (attentional selection), and at generating a shared understanding for coordinated action. This requires a perspective in which the negotiation of meaning of information that is embedded in emergency management become visible. This allows emergency managers to unravel the impacts of differences in institutional and cultural backgrounds and to consider those diversities as a factors enabling/facilitating the collective sense-making. Nevertheless, cognitive diversity is not always a virtue when it comes to collective cognitive processes. On the one hand, evidence suggest that cognitive heterogeneity is useful in mitigating against the cognitive biases that are associated with collective sense-making (e.g. confirmation biases) (Smart & Sycara, 20. On the other hand, different background knowledge and belief can represent a barrier to collective cognitive processes (Smart & Sycara, 2013).
The experiences in EDUCEN demonstrate that in order to shift cultural diversity from a barrier to an enabling factor for cooperative emergency management, requires methods and tools to enhance the understanding of the dynamic processes influencing the interactions among different actors in the different phases of the DRR.

The first step is to map the network of interactions among the different emergency responders, both institutional and non-institutional and to analyse the flow of information and cooperation activated during the different phases. Examples are provided in the case study of l’Aquila and of the city of Lorca.


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Kees Boersma and Jeroen Wolbers

One of the most pronounced key challenges in emergency management concerns how to adequately share information and coordinate the rescue efforts of different emergency response organizations. In emergency response various organizations with different backgrounds, specialized operational expertise, and professional jargons try to develop a shared understanding of the situation. In order to do so, they must bridge their jurisdictional and organizational boundaries. This is challenging because each response organization has operational field units at different levels, different functional command structures, and separate back offices for information and resource management. Consequently, emergency management literature often describes failing information management due to problems of information overload, difficulties with information technologies and validation of information, and insufficient attention for data sharing (Comfort and Kapucu, 2006; Kapucu, 2006; Moynihan, 2009; Netten and Van Someren, 2011).

Recently scholars have started to address the cultural dimension in emergency response operations. For example, Morris, Morris and Jones (2007) describe that the success of the US Coast Guard rescue operations in the aftermath of hurricane Katrina was based upon being able to speak the different professional languages of many different stakeholders. In a different analysis of the response to Hurricane Katrina, Moynihan (2012) shows how the Department of Defence performed a culture- switch to adopt to a new multi-stakeholder operational logic. Similarly, Tsai and Chi (2012) argue that cultural distance is the missing link in explaining the gap between desired and perceived effectiveness of Incident Command System in Japan and Taiwan.

Yet, a coherent perspective on the cultural dimension of multi-organizational response operations is missing. The main focus of this chapter is, therefore, to explore the cultural dimension in multi- organizational emergency response coordination. We propose a coherent cultural model, which builds upon and integrates several years of empirical studies into Dutch emergency response organizations (Boersma et al., 2010; 2012; 2014; Wolbers et al., 2012; Wolbers and Boersma, 2013; Treurniet et al., 2016; Wolbers, 2016).


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Organizational culture has been described as a pattern of (a) basic, shared assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) and instrumental for organizational members to cope with problems and uncertainties (Schein, 1996; Giorgi et al., 2015). It is seen as the social glue that holds the organizational members together. In the case of emergency responders this means that the fire department, police and ambulance services each have distinct cultural characteristics that give the professionals an unique identity, but at the same time can also cause misunderstanding between them as soon as they have to work together.
However, the description of culture as a static set of shared assumptions is an oversimplification of the actual situation. Stories of first responders provide us with a far more complex and dynamic picture, showing that tensions can develop because of cognitive and normative diversity within a particular response organization. The attribution of meaning (an important part of the cultural process) is complicated and can lead to fragmentation as well as integration, diversity as well as unity. In line with JoAnne Martin’s organizational cultural analysis (2002), we argue that a monolithic approach that sees each response organization as having an own ‘culture’, neglects the complexity of the cultural dimension. In order to understand the role of culture in the multi-organizational, and dynamic environment in which emergency responders operate, we propose a model that adheres to
that complexity. We do so, by addressing the practices of emergency responders from an interpretive perspective, which considers organizational culture:

  1. to be a layered phenomenon, which including the values and the deep assumptions within the organization,
  2. to be multi-dimensional since it is not a static, monolithic phenomenon in which each organization has a distinctive culture (i.e. are integrated). Instead, these cultures can also be differentiated (i.e. have subcultures) or be fragmentized (i.e. different perspectives can exist within one subculture) and they can change over time,
  3. to be an outcome of sensemaking and sensegiving in which organizational members (de/re)construct reality based upon these processes to find out what is going on in times of uncertainty.

In the actual practice of emergency response operations, we have often witnessed professionals from the different response organizations in discussion with one another about the characteristics of the emergency, their actions, and the consequences of the actions for the response operation. This interaction is characterized by a process we regard as negotiation. We propose a model of cultural- in-practice to capture the recurring processes of negotiating actions and interpretations between emergency responders. The negotiation between emergency responders take place in trading zones: situations in which local coordination of ideas and action take place despite differences in the (professional) backgrounds, norms, and routines the first responders (see for this concept: Galison, 1997). A trading zone as a setting that embodies coordination efforts, is an ongoing accomplishment in which diverse groups interact across their boundaries, by agreeing on the rules of the trade, while the objects traded can mean different things to both groups.
The trading zone has four dimensions. First, groups that interact in the trading zone have different professional backgrounds, a phenomenon that we call: epistemics. Second, by developing their own professional knowledge and standards these groups create an own identity. Third, the groups confront their different interpretations by initiating in a negotiation process across their professional boundaries through boundary work. Fourth, this negotiation process occurs by sharing the interpretations of a particular situation by storytelling. We have placed these elements on two axes in a culture model (figure 5.2.1).
The vertical axe in our culture model shows the diverse nature and backgrounds of emergency responders interacting in the trading zone, through their epistemics and identity.

Epistemics refers to the jargon of different professional languages in relation to the organizational practices in which this professional knowledge is developed (Knorr Cetina, 1999). The connection with actual practices is important to understand the relations between the concepts in our layered culture model, as epistemics are made up of patterns of activities that are constructed in daily interaction, that demarcate the existence particular professional fields. By interacting with artifacts the professionals generated knowledge that is seen as particular to that field, which also creates a boundary between different epistemics. In this way the epistemics can be directly related to processes of brokering ideas between different communities.

Identity refers to professionals who tend to identify themselves with their own organization; especially in situations in which they are confronted with other professional organizations (Tajfel and Turner, 1986). We acknowledge the necessity for the strong identification and loyalty of the members with their operational field. At the same time, in the dynamics of emergency response operations the context in which identification occurs often changes to result in ‘identity work’ (Alvesson, 2000). This leads to the situated nature of identity, which means that in one context one identifies with being an emergency responder working together with other emergency responders, while in another context one might identify him or herself with being a police officer who has to work together with a fire officer.

The horizontal axe in our culture model focuses on the action and practices of emergency response in-action, in which storytelling and boundary work takes place.

Boundary Work describes the process of sharing information across the boundaries of organizations (Star and Griesemer, 1989) to negotiate actions and interpretations (Kellogg et al., 2006). Boundary spanning occurs when emergency responders interrelate on the basis of understanding each other’s needs and requirements for coordination. Learning how to bring together each other’s complementary skills, learning from the experience of others and closely examining information is a key asset for developing cross-boundary coordination. Boundary objects are part of coordination mechanisms by representation, which offer a common referent that people can use to interact, align work and create shared meaning.

Story telling conceptualizes the process of sharing and making explicit the interpretations of emergency responders, in which they describe the situation and their actions (Feldman et al., 2004). The stories told by the first responders have a plot (the main message), characters (what are the relevant actors in the story) and a narrative (what is the story about and how is the story presented). Through sharing their stories implicit, problem conceptualizations are made tangible by signalling potential problems, clarifying misunderstandings and exchanging information.


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Our trading zone model aims at unravelling the cultural dimension by exploring and understanding sensemaking and sensegiving practices of emergency response professionals (Weick, 1995; Weick et al., 2005; Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). As sensemaking is a process that describes how actors perceive and enact their environment, we adhere to an interpretative, constructionist perspective (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2006). This perspective focuses on collecting and analysing data in which the stories of the actors involved are central. Storytelling (narrative analysis) as a method enables the researcher to uncover the otherwise hidden assumptions of the emergency responders, as well as
their organizational values. Through stories actors implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, negotiate their interpretations and actions. The ethnographic approach (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2004) is very useful in unravelling trading zones since it enables the researcher to follow the real-life conversations and the negotiation of the interpretations of the emergency responders. A typical cultural study based on our model takes place by adopting three methods: observations, interviews and document analysis to come to a triangulation of data.


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Negotiation in the trading zone is not a neutral process; it involves power and interests. A such, for emergency response to engage in a trading zone, a stance is required that increases their reflexivity. Reflexivity and knowing in-action (Schön, 1987; Thompson, 2008) can make differences, power, and interests that are embedded in interpretation processes explicit. Increasing reflexivity can be achieved by telling stories about the bottlenecks that emerge in the response operation. This often makes the different interpretations of the situation the actors adhere to explicit. Yet, is not only important to tell the story from one perspective, but it is especially important to include the other professional perspectives as well. Reflexivity allows the emergency responders to make their different professional backgrounds visible to themselves and others, and find new creative solutions to traverse their professional boundaries. This, of course, is a learning process that (literally) needs training and education, in order to let professionals recognize the constraining and enabling characteristics of multi-organizational work. Reflexivity starts with the recognition of the problem, and continues with the development of affective responses and empathy. Therefore, a multi- organizational operation in emergency response involves asking and answering the questions (Yanow, 1997): What do I do? Why do I do it? What does it mean for me, as a professional, and for the other professionals I work with and for? In this way, first responders can create a trust in each other’s skills and routines, and work towards a shared process of sensemaking and sensegiving.


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Raffaele Giordano and Alessandro Pagano

How can we make coordination among the different responders more effective, when a fast and efficient response is required? Enhancing the coordination effectiveness in case of emergency among the different responders is the main scope of several studies aimed at overcoming the main organizational factors hindering cooperation. Up to now, most research has been carried out on what happens within a single organisation under stress, while knowledge is still limited on what happens when multiple organisations need to coordinate in unison to make the best of their capacity in a highly stressful environment. Different barriers can hamper the coordination and communication among different responders, i.e. lack of cross-sectors structures, lack of common goals, lack of common concepts, lack of distribution of information, lack of trust, competitive practices and lack of situational awareness.

Organizational culture is emerging as a crucial aspect to be considered in assessing the performance of an organization. In emergency, organizational culture affects the way different responders interpret the situation, organize tasks and interact with the others.
Existing formal protocols of interaction ignore how cultural diversities, with specific reference to organizational culture, influence the way different actors perceive the topology of their own interactional network, and, consequently, their strategies to cooperate with other entities. Empirical evidences demonstrate how some actors assume a strongly hierarchical structure of the interactions (Sorensen & Stanton, 2013). Other actors consider the multi-central structure as the most effective one to allow the rapid exchange of information and cooperation within each level of the organizational structure and between different levels (Smart & Sycara, 2013). Neglecting these differences could lead to the development of ineffective procedures for emergency management, because the actors will not recognize the network through which they collect the information and cooperate as trustable.

The dynamic and complex nature of crisis situations does not allow for a static framework of the crisis responses. Interaction networks change dramatically during an emergency. Some actors could assume the role of informal leaders, whereas the official responders could be characterized by a low level of trust. The existing institutional protocols for information management in case of emergency seem incapable of adapting themselves to this changing interactional situation.

Finally, the process of interpreting the emergency information (i.e. sensemaking) has to be considered as a social process aiming at selectively focus on certain stimuli and responses (attentional selection), and at generating a shared understanding for coordinated action. This requires a perspective in which the negotiation of meaning of information that is embedded in emergency management become visible. This allows emergency managers to unravel the impacts of differences in institutional and cultural backgrounds and to consider those diversities as a factors enabling/facilitating the collective sense-making. Nevertheless, cognitive diversity is not always a virtue when it comes to collective cognitive processes. On the one hand, evidence suggest that cognitive heterogeneity is useful in mitigating against the cognitive biases that are associated with collective sense-making (e.g. confirmation biases) (Smart & Sycara, 20. On the other hand, different background knowledge and belief can represent a barrier to collective cognitive processes (Smart & Sycara, 2013).
The experiences in EDUCEN demonstrate that in order to shift cultural diversity from a barrier to an enabling factor for cooperative emergency management, requires methods and tools to enhance the understanding of the dynamic processes influencing the interactions among different actors in the different phases of the DRR.
The first step is to map the network of interactions among the different emergency responders, both institutional and non-institutional and to analyse the flow of information and cooperation activated during the different phases. Examples are provided in the case study of l’Aquila and of the city of Lorca.


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Most of the efforts carried out for enhancing coordination effectiveness were meant to innovate the information technology for internal and external communication, information production and sharing, task information and allocation, coordinated decision-making process and analytical tools.
The implementation of information management and communication technologies, even innovative (e.g. internet-of-things, smartphone, smart city cameras and traffic lights, etc.), failed in many situations because of the oversimplification of the social processes at the base of emergency information management. The key steps in the process of transforming risk information and warning into actions – i.e. hearing, understanding, believing, personalizing and deciding – are mediated through social structures. Exposing all individuals to the same information in the same way, without accounting for the different social structures and organizational culture, is likely to negatively affect the ability to generate novel ideas and interpretations of the emergency situation.
Evidences show that effective coordination support system should account for the cultural diversities among the responders, which affect the way actors search and interpret the situational information, and interact with others. Among the different available information systems, Operational Picture (OP) has gained the interest of different researchers and practitioners. This is because these systems facilitate the access to real- time, spatio-temporal information on the evolution of the emergency and matching responses, in other words, situational information. An OP aims at supporting Situational Awareness (SA) of the different actors involved in the emergency management operations. SA is a key concept in emergency management and in the whole cycle of Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR), being related to the fast reconnaissance of the extent of affected areas and the potential number of victims, the damage magnitude and the consequent needs that may be expected. Further, this picture of damage and needs as well as the unravelling of the disaster situation itself will change with time, also in direct connection with the dynamics of the surrounding environment and the effect of actions. Shared situational awareness (SSA) is further defined as the degree to which different actors involved in the disaster response activities are characterized by a shared understanding of the subset of information that is necessary to achieve their goals. An OP provides data and information feeding evidences about what is happening, who is intervening and where things are happening. Common Operational Pictures (COP) are further development of the OP systems, enabling all actors involved in the emergency response to achieve and share situational information in a geographically distributed environments.

Read more about: Network analysis to identify key actors and key vulnerabilities


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The analysis of the interaction ties in the network allows comprehending the actual role of the different actors in the network. That is, besides the institutional roles described in the protocols of intervention, the actors could impact the effectiveness of the network performance. The complexity of the surrounding network, both in-coming and out-going, allow us to identify the most central actors in the network, that is, those actors who are capable to collect information from different areas of the network. These actors are “in the know”. Crucial for the network performance is the “information hub”, that is, actors that can act as interface in the information sharing process, moving information from one part of the network to the others. Similarly, the network analysis brings out the most important information in the network. That is, information whose availability is crucial for performing most of the tasks in emergency management.
Network analysis allows us to detect the main aspects of vulnerability in the network: those elements that could lead to failures of the network, lower performance, reduced adaptability, reduced information gathering, etc. Network management strategies need to be implemented in order to reduce these.
The patterns of interactions effect different processes at the basis of the network performance in case of crisis, i.e. knowledge transfer, information sharing, collaborative actions, etc. One of the main characteristics is the density of the social ties: the more social ties, the more possibilities for collective action, for collaboration and for the developing a common understanding (Shared Situational Awareness). The degree of cohesion of a network describes to what extent the network “hangs together” instead of separating it into separate sub-groups. The existence of sub-groups can pose challenges for joint action. Yet, only a few subgroups with relatively strong ties between them can ensure that the network is managed, in a ‘ polycentric’ way. This kind of network can facilitate bridges between disparate views and help formulate a shared understanding and framing of the problem, leading to a sounder management strategy.
The map of the interactions allows to better comprehend the actual role played by the different actors in supporting the emergency management. That is, besides their institutional roles, the different actors could enhance/reduce the effectiveness of the emergency management by enabling/hampering the interaction and the flow of information during the different phases of the emergency management.
The map of the network could be used to analyse and unravel the complexity of interactions, allowing to identify the key elements in the network and the main vulnerabilities. To this aim, graph theory measures are implemented.
The interaction network of both institutional and non-institutional responders in Lorca, Spain in the San Venceslao flood episode of 2012 and after the 2009 earthquake in l’Aquila.

The results of this analysis can be used to support the development of strategies aiming at improving the emergency management through the enhancement of the network performance. Two different groups of actions can be implemented to this aim:

  • actions putting the key elements at the core of emergency management protocols, e.g. enhancing the sharing of key information, emphasizing the role of key actors, etc.
  • actions reducing key elements of vulnerability, e.g. increasing the speed of information by increasing the capabilities of the central agents to have access to crucial information.

Read more about: Network analysis to identify key actors and key vulnerabilities


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Interaction represents the mechanism allowing the different actors to interpret their environment, to achieve a satisfactory shared understanding of the situation, and to cope with the organizational and individual improvisation needed to deal with extreme events. Moreover, interactions allow to mitigate the conflicting interpretation of information about emergency due to differences in knowledge belief, customs and assumptions. Therefore, a better understanding of the complex network of interactions activated during the different DRR phases is of utmost importance.

Most of the efforts carried out in the field of organizational studies demonstrate that the network of interactions influencing the performance of a certain organization is more complex than the simple network involving the different agents. An organization can be modeled and characterized as a set of interlocked networks connecting four key entities operating within the organization, i.e. people, knowledge, resources and tasks. Therefore, in order to better comprehend this complex network of interaction, analytical methods are required capable to conceptualize not only the attributes of these entities, but also the set of relations and ties among them. The Meta-matrix conceptual framework could be implemented to this aim. This approach conceives the organization as composed by: social network, knowledge network, resources network, assignment network, information network, resources requirement and knowledge requirement.


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The cultural learning component in the EDUCEN project has facilitated a learning process to identify enabling and disenabling factors for culture and social dynamics to be recognized in DRR. The process has led to the identification of volunteers and gatekeepers as important actors in strengthening current DRR strategies and plans in Europe.

Volunteering can mean different things to different people. Here we refer to volunteerism as the planned voluntary behaviour intended to benefit others, taking place within an organisational setting, for a prolonged period (Cumming, 2012). Volunteerism is a fundamental source of community strength and resilience that exists in all societies. It is expressed through a wide range of activities, including traditional forms of mutual aid and self-help, formal service delivery, campaigning and advocacy, as well as other forms of civic participation (UNV, 2011).

The role and contribution of volunteerism is well recognized and highlighted in the Sendai Framework for DRR as crucial for adopting a more people-centred preventive approach to disaster risk. When a disaster happens, volunteers are often the first to act (UNV, 2011). However, the integration of volunteers and civil society organisations throughout the disaster management cycle varies between different contexts. The form and extent of volunteers’ integration into formal DRR activities, as well as perceptions on what their role is differ greatly.

During a workshop with stakeholders from five different European cities in Lorca (Spain), L’Aquila (Italy), Kristianstad (Sweden) and Dordrecht (the Netherlands), participants highlighted the role of volunteer organisations as important for mobilizing society, for communicating across sectors and groups, for negotiating amongst competing demands, and for advocating solutions that benefit groups rather than individuals.

While gatekeepers (discussed below) were seen as crucial for reaching particular social groups, volunteer organisations were considered important for mediating between different social groups. Despite positive developments towards increased civil society participation through volunteer organisations, there remain several challenges related to their integration and coordination, as well as level of trust from civil society. “Sometimes volunteers may be a burden and create additional problems. The timing is crucial to determine who should be involved when. If there are too many without having a clear role they will create problems and require resources for food and accommodation” argued a participant. “In the Spanish case, the lack of coordination and proper training of volunteers can create additional problems. The large, organized associations have their own structure and division of roles, however, coordinating between organisations and the ‘frugal’ volunteers that show up in the face of emergency and the government institutions is complicated and very challenging” argued another participant. “Sometimes people do not trust volunteers: in Spain volunteers are a very heterogeneous group, some are professionals and many know what they are doing, but not all of them. There is a perception that they do not have the knowledge or capacity which is not accurate” argued a participant.

Less vulnerability coupled with high levels of trust in institutions limits the role of volunteers in DRR
The Netherlands and Sweden have a different experience on the role of volunteers in DRR than the Southern cities in Italy and Spain. The fundamental difference is linked to the fact that neither Sweden nor the Netherlands have much recent experience in disasters. As a result the role of civil society and volunteers remains unclear. During the workshop representatives from Sweden and the Netherlands shared that a key factor that they believe has limited the role of volunteers and civil society in general has to do with trust. In Sweden and the Netherlands there is high level of trust associated with government agencies and people tend to seek information from the government as opposed to civil society.

Stakeholders identified volunteers as a heterogeneous group with different capacities, levels of training and availability. These organisations ranged from well-established volunteer organisations with internal structures such as the Red Cross to more spontaneous volunteers that showed up during an emergency. Authorities often lack knowledge about the different capacities and strengths of voluntary groups and individuals, which can put people at risk. It is a complex task to find where the different capacities fit and at what time. When a group is organized it is easy to collaborate with them, if not, it adds a level of complexity.

Participants highlighted the need for governments and volunteers to co-develop a long term plan and a strategy to have the right people ready at the right time throughout the DRR cycle, and not only during an emergency. In Italy for example, there is often much focus on the emergency phase, but volunteers are needed to work with awareness raising and public opinion as well, for building understanding amongst youth and accessing other groups in society. For this, volunteers would need a different type of training than the one available today, for instance in capacity building on existing legislations for DRR and emergency response.

The experiences in Spain and Italy of past and present hazards have led to continuous improvements on strategies and action plans in DRR and DRM and was believed to be an important factor to engage volunteers as an important group in DRR and DRM. An attempt to improve coordination of volunteers was made both in the Spanish and Italian cases by creating a contact database to keep track of individuals. In Spain, this database only contains contact information of the persons volunteering. In L’Aquila, the database also specifies their main skills, experiences and capacities. However, neither of the countries has established quality controls, assigned budgets or personnel in charge of maintaining and updating the databases. Thus, the databases are often unreliable and are not used.

We learned that Sweden has extensive experience both nationally and internationally with a long-standing tradition of preventive policies and has a continued presence in supporting international management of disasters (Björngren Cuadra, 2015). However, despite an increasing topicality internationally, volunteer work in Sweden can be said to have a relatively undeveloped role and function in the context of disasters as well as in serious events and crises. There are two potential explanations for this. The first is that in an international comparative perspective, the serious events that Sweden faces are fairly limited in scope. Sweden is geologically and geographically situated in a region that is struck by neither earthquakes nor tsunamis, even though floods, droughts and forest fires have recently caused significant damage. The second is due to that the state assumes all social responsibilities through an encompassing welfare state system which is believed to have hampered the establishment and role of voluntary organisations in DRR and DRM.

In Sweden, while rescue services have the legal mandate to request help from civil society in case of an emergency, there is a stark contrast with the levels of organisation and integration of voluntary work in Italy, where the national organisation and coordination of voluntary work in the country has evolved over several decades of experience in handling disasters. Today civil protection is a complex, surprisingly non-hierarchical, and highly organized agency composed by various voluntary groups across the country and with a clear mandate and jurisdiction to respond to society’s needs during times of crises.

Italy has long-time experience of a well-developed voluntary organisation that operates across the country, and which in times of crises can function better and may be more reliably than the government itself. Similarly to Italy, Spain has a long history of different disaster events. Civil society has an important role in DRR. The formal inclusion of voluntary organisations into DRR in Spain has been traced to 1982 following the Tous dam event, which is considered one of the most significant socio-natural disasters in the history of the country during the twentieth century. That event triggered a paradigm change in the way disaster risks were perceived and managed locally and at multiple levels of governance. A concrete result from these changes was, amongst others, increased public participation particularly of voluntary groups to establish a warning system (Serra-Llobet, Tàbara, & Sauri, 2013). In Lorca for example, local associations together with voluntary organisations and the private sector currently cooperate to create new warning systems through for instance new technologies.


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The concept of local leaders or gatekeepers can be traced back to ethnographic methods where it is understood as an individual who directly or indirectly provides access to key resources, be those resources logistical, human, institutional, or informational (Campbell et al., 2006). Engaging with gatekeepers entails the establishment of an ever-evolving relationship which has deep implications for how a researcher or practitioner understands a particular context and interacts with stakeholders. The opposite is also true. If gatekeepers are key individuals to access people or resources, they can also be obstacles, particularly in contexts where power relationships are reversed, but also in communities where traditional authority structures are in place (Campbell et al., 2006).

The concept of gatekeepers is used in a wide range of disciplines including geography, anthropology, management, urban planning, medicine, but also in disaster studies. In DRR, the concept of gatekeepers is sometimes understood as people who are in positions of power and possess large amounts of information on certain matters in a group. Gatekeepers in this context are deemed important individuals who maintain interactions with other group members in order to transfer information.

The definition of gatekeepers is not static. They act as mediators between culturally or linguistically diverse communities, and between communities and managing institutions. Their role is crucial because people with culturally or linguistically diverse backgrounds often prioritize social networks and informal sources of information, particularly in cases where language barriers exist or when communities mistrust the government (Shepherd and van Vuuren, 2014). The role of gatekeeping has not been adequately investigated in the context of disasters and emergency risk communication. However, some studies (Shepherd and van Vuuren, 2014) suggest that incorporating gatekeepers in DRR activities could contribute towards better emergency management preparation, but this requires an understanding of the cultural constructions of risk.

Stakeholders from L’Aquila highlighted the importance of gatekeepers as “cultural mediators” especially in marginal communities and refugee and immigrant populations: “The differences in social networks and groups could be better taken into account in plans and emergency activities through a better inclusion of gatekeepers in planning activities.” In contrast, the group from Lorca discussed the importance of gatekeepers in rural versus urban areas, arguing that gatekeepers are particularly important in rural areas as they can act as bridges and canalize information to the population and report back to the authorities. For instance, “farm owners can help evaluating damages, risks and canalizing the information and local needs to the authorities”, explained a participant.

In both Lorca and L’Aquila, gatekeepers were only made visible following a disaster event. The role of gatekeepers did not exist until the disasters occurred and there was a need to know about the others and inform neighbourhood associations without the traditional communication channels, which were destroyed or seriously disturbed after the disaster. Both groups agreed that the challenge now is to explore how to include gatekeepers in formal DRR plans and prevention work. They both spoke about the importance of developing and maintaining databases or applications that facilitate communication with gatekeepers. At the same time they argued that the cost of such action would be too high and that local authorities would not see the importance of investing on this action.

All cases agreed that it is important to plan in advance on how to identify gatekeepers. The challenge is how to do this. Crises are different and happen in different ways. For instance, in Lorca leaders during the floods were farmers, but farmers had no responsibility or leadership role during the earthquake. Different disasters gave rise to different leaders, because people were affected in different ways. Lastly, the role of leaders can change over time, and the process of identification needs to be continuous. A leader today might not be a leader tomorrow. Moreover, a positive leader able to unify individuals from a particular group, mediate between them and authorities, and communicate with other groups, could also turn into a negative one. This dynamic role of gatekeepers highlights the need for maintaining close contact with cultural leaders (e.g. persons officially or unofficially representing an ethnic or occupational group), religious leaders, and key actors within age groups (e.g. elderly or young); while at the same time remaining flexible for possible new actors.

Participants from the cities in Spain and Italy highlighted how following a series of disastrous events, there has been an increased recognition on the role of key individuals in civil society to act as mediators or information nodes between some social groups and managing institutions. In these two countries, DRR approaches are starting to change towards more inclusive management structures due to the realization that civil society participation could fill the vacuum that state agencies have failed to fill. For instance, in cities like L’Aquila, where trust might be greater for key members of civil society than for some governmental institutions, having a mediating actor that enjoys support from both society and the government might be necessary to communicate and mobilize groups; or in Lorca where there are large minority groups with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds. For some of these minority groups, a gatekeeper or leader might play an important role for giving the group visibility and voice. This is important in order to communicate the group’s particular needs as may be the case with refugee groups or certain ethnic groups.

In Spain for instance, the history of integrated risk management is more recent than in Italy, with the failure of the Tous dam in 1982 which triggered a more inclusive approach. Despite this, effective civil society participation remains a challenge, and interest to reach society varies greatly within and across managing institutions. In Lorca, for instance, some of the managing institutions have increased and improved their contact with local leaders through the EDUCEN project. This in turn gave institutions a better understanding of the problems, needs and wants of citizens in the area, but also an overview of available capacity amongst individuals which could be crucial for preventing fatalities during risk situations. However, the process driving this change has been met with lack of interest and resistance from some of the institutions, and scepticism from some of the members of civil society in Lorca.

In contrast to the Italian and Spanish experiences, the Swedish and Dutch cases admitted there is very little contact with social groups. In fact, participants were not aware of whether there are local leaders, who these might be, and whether they have a role to play in DRR. The role of local leaders or gatekeepers to build community resilience seems to be a concept often associated with the poorer corners of the world. In an international context, this is reflected in two ways: first, there is far less academic literature on the role of leaders and gatekeepers in countries like Sweden and the Netherlands, than in countries like Bangladesh or Nepal. Studies assessing cooperation across sectors in emergency management typically focus on the role of formal state and non-state institutions, but leave out “informal” leaders like gatekeepers (see for instance Nohrstedt, 2016; Nohrstedt and Bodin, 2014). In fact the only instance where civil society is represented in these studies is through “formal” voluntary associations, which play a minor role in Swedish disaster management, as explained in the section above. Second, donor countries, like Sweden and the Netherlands, have a strong focus in building resilience through local participation in recipient countries but not at home. Despite this, participants from both cities admitted seeing the value of connecting with gatekeepers, but like participants from Spain and Italy, thought it was difficult to identify and contact them.


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A list of concrete recommendations to improve the work of volunteers in the DRR cycle, and increase the participation of gatekeepers in formal DRR work was produced by participants in the EDUCEN stakeholder workshop held in Stockholm. During the workshop representatives with different occupational backgrounds within DRR identified, described and reflected upon the role of volunteers and gatekeepers in DRR in their own cities. The conclusions emerging from this encounter can help DRR authorities improve their work with awareness raising and public participation, and for building social capital across sectors (public-private) and social groups with different cultural or ethnic backgrounds.

The interaction between stakeholders from different cultural and professional backgrounds demonstrated the importance to share experiences and identify similarities and differences in work on DRR between cities in Europe. The participants confirmed the need for greater attention to the role of volunteers and gatekeepers to build awareness in current policy planning for DRR.

A common message from all the cities is the need for improved involvement of volunteers in DRR. However, the ways to achieve this differed in each of the contexts. Whilst the role of volunteers is to a higher degree institutionalized in DRR in Southern Europe, cities representing Northern Europe shared that the government is the leading agent and civil society continues to play a marginal role. Thus, the potential to improve the role of civil society in Northern European contexts should be further assessed.

The role of gatekeepers is often disregarded in DRR work, despite the recognized benefits of engaging with this type of stakeholders. There is a need to allocate time within the local government to identify and work with local leaders and other respected individuals in the community, particularly to build awareness and improve ways to ensure effective communication before and during an event. The workshop showed the differences between Lorca and L’Aquila where frequency in disasters have influenced improved communication and led to more sophisticated ways to communicate. For instance, civil society and the private sector in Lorca and Spain have played an important role in the development of new communication gadgets. By contrast, the lack of cultural memory in Sweden and the Netherlands of flood events were emphasized as a limiting factor among communities to demand information and efforts to share information from the government.


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After acknowledging the benefits and challenges in volunteer and gatekeeper inclusion
workshop participants collectively made the following recommendations to enhance understanding and action on the role of volunteers and gatekeepers in DRR:

  • Increased participation of volunteers during the preparedness phase can be one of the most important and feasible actions for improving DRR work. Besides from creating risk awareness amongst volunteers, this can also enhance trust towards volunteer organisations, as volunteers establish a continuous relation rather than a one-time intervention.
  • Improve the existing contact databases of volunteers and complement it with information on individual capacities (e.g. skills, experience, specific training). The main responsibility of managing this action would be on local authorities who would need to designate a budget to identify the different volunteer groups, develop and maintain the database and support the coordination with civil protection.
  • Improve training for volunteers to include actions important for the whole DRR cycle, not only the emergency phase, like for instance basic legal and policy knowledge related to DRR; and to diversify sources of funding for training volunteers through for instance the private sector.
  • Create one strategy for identification and inclusion of both volunteers and gatekeepers and have a plan on how to use spontaneous (volunteers/gatekeepers) in the best way.
  • Engage older people, like the retired, who often have more time to participate in issues concerning their communities. They are also a particularly vulnerable group who might have a personal interest in engaging in DRR questionsInclude religious leaders who often have a well-established relation of trust to a group of the population. They can act as informants and mediators between managing agencies and civil society and between interest groups.
  • Improve communication and cooperation with the private sector, particularly insurance companies, who have a good understanding of people’s assets and vulnerabilities. In some countries, insurance companies are already integrated in DRR work. In others insurance companies and managing agencies continue to operate in silos. Increased cooperation and information exchange could be beneficial for the government, the companies involved, as well as the clients.
  • Establish contact with local or thematic journalists who may hold important information and in some places might have good relations with local populations. They could act as mediators between civil society and managing institutions. Often, information coming from local journalists has higher credibility and reaches society faster than the official information disseminated by official government channels.
  • Design a strategy for institutional stakeholder engagement. Some governmental agencies might have a better relation with society than others due to their role and jurisdiction. For instance it is probably easier for civil protection to access and contact gatekeepers than it might be for an organisation like the water managing institutions (Confederación Hidrográfica in Spain) which might be perceived as a “water police” rather than a civil society advocate. With good communication structures in place across managing institutions, several actors might be able to access the information gathered by institutions that lie closer to society.
  • Women groups could provide a window of opportunity to access marginalized or foreign groups. However, these groups might not always be labelled “women’s group”, but could take the form of knitting groups, yoga groups, reading groups, or religious circles. In other places there might be a “gender” organisation or political party.
  • Sport organisations can provide a link to youth but also may be able to provide “space” in times of a crisis, for instance by providing access to football fields to build temporary camps, or gyms to provide for temporary shelter. Sport organisations are often used to work in teams and could therefore also contribute with organisational skills during an emergency.

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Sebastiaan Rietjens

“While retaining its primary role of safeguarding the country from external threats, the military has become one of the main partners of federal, state, and local agencies in disaster response operations, providing its available resources, logistical capacity, and operational services effectively used against both man-made and natural disasters” (Kapucu 2011, p. 7).
In studying the role of the armed forces in domestic disaster response operations, most attention has been paid to homeland security or counter terrorist activities, in particular in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, Madrid, and London.
Relatively little attention, however, has been paid to the role of the armed forces in addressing domestic natural disasters. In such a context, the involvement of the armed forces can be manifold and may include a variety of activities. Sylves (2008, p. 172) lists a great number of these activities including: search and rescue; emergency medical care; emergency transport of people; mass feeding; in-kind distribution of food, clothing, and other necessary commodities; epidemiological work and disease control; decontamination (in hazardous materials or radiological circumstances); temporary sheltering; firefighting; help in restoration of electric power and other utility services; debris removal to reopen roads; and bridge repair or temporary bridge replacement, as well as offer security and property protection aid. Armed forces are frequently requested to contribute to disaster response operations: are usually well organized, trained, mobile, well equipped, and available (Clarke, 2006, p. 1). Kapucu (2011, p. 9) stresses that armed forces

  • have manpower with specific qualifications, skills and expertise;
  • forces are capable of a strategic and rapid mobilization;
  • have a variety of equipment (e.g. helicopters, aircraft, earth-moving machinery, respirators, medical supplies, power and lighting equipment, under-water capability) that most other emergency organisations lack.

Moreover, “the military’s relative autonomy and efficient bureaucratic structure with hierarchical rules; which are effective in command, coordination, and control of manpower, authority, and regulations, is beneficial in providing effective response actions”. (Kapucu, 2011, p. 9)


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When civilian agencies request military support, there are three guiding principles according to Salmon et al. (2011, p. 141):

  • “Military aid should always be the last resort, with the use of mutual aid, other agencies and the private sector all having been considered as insufficient or unsuitable;
  • The civil authority lacks the required capability to fulfil the task and it is unreasonable or prohibitively expensive to expect it to develop one; and
  • The civil authority has a capability, but the need to act is urgent and it lacks readily available resources.”

Additional factors that should be taken into consideration when requesting military support are (e.g. Kapucu, 2011; FEMA, 2008; Schrader, 1993):
-1 Legality: whether the legal basis of military involvement aligns with the national laws and regulations that are in place (Kapucu, 2011). Most, if not all, European countries have specified the conditions under which armed forces may support in disaster response operations.
-2 The potential cost of military involvement and its impact on the budget of the Ministry of Defence must be determined. Military assets are more costly than similar assets of civilian emergency responders in light of the reliability, security and robustness of military assets. Wiharta et al. (2008, p. 43), however, also stress that “because military assets are usually kept in a state of readiness for quick deployment, defence ministries already cover their procurement and basic running costs, whether the assets are being used or not. Thus, the idea that deploying military assets is much more expensive than deploying civilian assets should be regarded with caution”.
Most western countries have mechanisms in place for sharing the costs of military involvement in assisting to disaster response operations. In the US for example the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reimburses the Department of Defence for some of the costs that occurred in disaster response operations (Schrader, 1993).
-3 Lethality: this defines the possibility of the use of lethal force while providing assistance. Although lethality is mainly an issue in cases of homeland security or counter terrorism, it may be important in the context of natural disasters as well. Several historical cases such as the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina have shown that maintaining law and order is an essential task to which armed forces also may contribute.
-4. Potential risks that may threaten the armed forces. Although the armed forces are trained to operate in unsafe places, natural disasters may pose severe risks to the soldiers that are being deployed. These risks may include the collapse of buildings, the danger of asphyxiation in case of (forest) fires or the breaching of dikes.
-5. The extent to which military services and resources are appropriate for providing assistance. Some practitioners and researchers involved argue that just because the military has the capacity to perform a task, it may not necessarily be the most appropriate entity to do so, since most militaries do not often train their personnel in disaster response. For example, the militaries apply different standards. They are expected to provide high-quality water to small populations rather than adequate water to large populations, as is needed in a natural disaster response (Wiharta, 2008). Also, in case of medical care militaries are mostly equipped to treat young men that are physically fit, while natural disasters may lead to many injuries (e.g. fractured bones) or patients (e.g. elderly, children) that the military is not used to deal with.
-6. The readiness of military forces to provide assistance that will not harm the primary mission of the Ministry of Defence (Kapucu, 2011; Buchalter 2007). In most countries the primary mission of the armed forces is safeguarding the country from external threats. Moreover, the armed forces of many western countries are heavily involved in overseas operations such as in Afghanistan, Iraq or Mali. This focus limits the readiness of the armed forces to get involved in domestic disaster response operations.


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Due to the growing diversity, complexity, and scale of many disasters, there is an increasing requirement for the military and civilian organisations to adequately coordinate their activities during disaster response operations (Salmon et al., 2011). For example, Hurricane Katrina, the BP Oil Spill in the Gulf of Mexico and the 2007 floods around Gloucestershire in the UK are all recent examples of disaster response operations in which military and civilian organisations worked alongside each other.

Despite its importance, civil-military coordination during domestic disaster response operations remains a neglected research area (Chen et al., 2008). The two tables illustrate the wide variety of issues emerging when civil and military organisations attempt to work closely together, for two recent cases as well as the recommendations and lessons that were learned during their evaluation.

Table 5.5.1 2007 UK floods, Gloucestershire region (Pitt, 2008; adapted from Salmon et al., 2009)

At a meta-level, Salmon et al. (2011, p. 153) have distilled and structured the issues that influence civil-military coordination during disaster response operations. They have grouped the issues into the following categories: the organisation, information management, communication, situation awareness, equipment, cultural issues and training.

Table 5.5.2. 2005 Hurricane Katrina, New Orleans (Banipal, 2006; adapted from Salmon et al., 2009)


Table 5.5.3 Issues limiting civil-military coordination during emergency responses (Salmon et al., 2011, p. 153). MACA stands for ‘’Military Aid to the Civil Authorities’’

Experiences with civil military coordination in domestic disaster response

For EDUCEN, the Netherlands Defence Academy (NLDA) explored the experiences with civil military interaction in two domestic disaster cases. In May 2016, the NLDA team interviewed several people who had been engaged in the disaster response after the April 2009 earthquake that hit the city of L’Aquila Italy. In November 2016, the NLDA team was present during an exercise in Marken, the Netherlands, which aimed, among others, to enhance interaction between civil and military actors involved in disaster response in the Netherlands.
For both cases, the following research questions were used:

  1. In what phases and how do military and civilian organizations interact in domestic operations and what problems and opportunities can be identified?
  2. To what extent and how were military actors confronted with culture? How did they deal with it?The preliminary research findings can be found below. The more extensive results will be published in an academic paper.

Experiences with civil military interaction in L’Aquila

In L’Aquila, NLDA -in cooperation with EDUCEN partner CNR IRSA- conducted five interviews with six persons who were employed with response organizations during the April 2009 earthquake. Interviews were held with personnel from the Red Cross, the military, fire brigade and the police. We asked them about their experiences working together with the military or civilian organizations and if and how they encountered culture.The Italian armed forces were involved in two main tasks:

  • Providing logistical support
  • Controlling the damaged area (or ‘red zone’) and preventing theft

Despite the broad presence of the armed forces in the area, which was extended until 2014, interactions with civil organizations were arranged through the national civil protection services. This entailed that ‘on the ground’ interactions were rather limited according to our respondents. Nevertheless, the respondents did identify problems and opportunities regarding the presence of the armed forces. An important advantage that was mentioned was the fact that military actors could work for long hours whereas civilian organizations often lacked the capacity and man-power to work uninterruptedly (also due to restrictions on consecutive working hours). The main challenge that was mentioned was the risk of ‘military arrogance’, or ‘militarization’ of the city. To moderate this, the military actors received special training which focused on interacting with citizens. Another beneficial factor that moderated the impact of military presence was the deployment of local military actors.

The advantage of having local responders was mentioned by several respondents. Local responders were for example able to assist outside forces in getting around, shortening the arrival time of emergency response. Moreover, they spoke the same dialect as most of the affected inhabitants, enabling them to provide a sense of familiarity and understanding. The local division of the Red Cross for example provided psychological help to people in the shelters. The fact that their personnel spoke in dialect and was trusted by the local people proved beneficial. Obviously, despite this advantage, the fact that they were local also entailed that the disaster impacted them personally, making the experience psychologically and emotionally challenging for them.

On 2 November 2016, NLDA was present at a two day simulation of a flood emergency exercise in Marken, the Netherlands. A dike breach was simulated requiring massive evacuation of residents. A total of 35 organizations were able to test their emergency plans and learn from the interaction with other partners. NLDA was present during the exercise to observe the interaction between military and civilian actors and spoke with 15 participants about their experiences.

The military actors were involved in the following activities during the exercise:

  • The evacuation of citizensDike strengthening
  • Providing a pontoon for transport of civil equipment
  • The interaction between civil and military actors started in the preparation phase which commenced nearly a year before the actual exercise.

This proved to be very helpful in ‘getting to know each other’ but it also revealed the first differences in organizational culture. It was for example mentioned by military respondents that the meetings with the civilian counterparts could have been
more efficient. Being used to a rather strict script whilst exercising, they had to adapt to a more flexible approach and non-binding commitments. The civilian actors on the other hand named the language, or jargon, used by the military actors as confusing and difficult to grasp. It was however mentioned by both the civilian and military respondents that the exercise helped to enhance mutual understanding and understanding of each other’s capacities. Moreover, several additional collaborations between organizations arose due to the exercise.

Although the respondents noted that the experiences with civil military interaction during the exercise were positive, remarks were also made regarding information sharing between agencies. It was for example found during the exercise that there was a lack of (technical) information on each other’s material. Moreover, during the evacuation, which was a collaborative effort between military and civilian actors, a lack of clarity regarding roles and responsibilities appeared. Both situations were resolved but point to the importance of considering these issues during the preparation phase.
A total of about 1000 civilians participated in the exercise. Unique for this exercise was also the participation of several locally based organizations (who work on a voluntary basis). This meant that there were opportunities for interaction with the local population and culture. It was for example noted by our respondents that the strong social cohesion that characterizes Marken was very helpful in engaging the local population and securing public support for the exercise.


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